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Most  of  society’s  innovation  systems  – academic  science,  the  patent  system,  open  source,  etc.  –  are  “open”
in the  sense  that they  are  designed  to  facilitate  knowledge  disclosure  among  innovators.  An essential
difference  across  innovation  systems  is whether  disclosure  is  of intermediate  progress  and solutions  or
of completed  innovations.  We theorize  and  present  experimental  evidence  linking  intermediate  versus
ﬁnal disclosure  to an ‘incentives-versus-reuse’  tradeoff  and  to  a transformation  of the innovation  search
process.  We  ﬁnd  intermediate  disclosure  has  the  advantage  of efﬁciently  steering  development  towardseywords:
nnovation
isclosures
earch
ncentives
olicy
improving  existing  solution  approaches,  but  also has  the  effect  of  limiting  experimentation  and  narrowing
technological  search.  We  discuss  the comparative  advantages  of intermediate  versus  ﬁnal  disclosure
policies  in  fostering  innovation.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).pen innovation
. Introduction
How do disclosure policies governing the reuse of knowledge,
echnology and innovations, once developed, affect the rate and
irection of inventive activity? Consider, for example, the imple-
entation of the “Bermuda Principles” by the Human Genome
roject (HGP). In return for stable, guaranteed funding, more
han one thousand research scientists representing more than 30
esearch laboratories in at least 19 countries agreed to following a
rocedure of releasing sequence data into the public domain within
4 hours of discovery (Contreras, 2011). Conducted over a thirteen-
ear period, the HGP was one of the most ambitious, large-scale,
cientiﬁc efforts in modern times. This process of near instan-
aneous disclosure of ﬁndings and methods, intended to enable
nvestigators to build on each others’ results and coordinate in
rder to more rapidly advance the frontiers of scientiﬁc knowl-
dge, yielded the structure of the human genome. This immediate
isclosure and public sharing of scientiﬁc results (sequences) was a
igniﬁcant departure from the usual academic practice of releasing
esults and analyses in the form of a published scientiﬁc journal
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 020 7000 8455; fax: +44 020 7000 8701.
E-mail addresses: kboudreau@london.edu (K.J. Boudreau),
@hbs.edu (K.R. Lakhani).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.08.001
048-7333/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article unarticle. (These intermediate outputs would later be used in more
typical scientiﬁc publications down the road). It was also in stark
contrast to the patenting and contracting strategy pursued by Cel-
era, the for-proﬁt ﬁrm that was racing against the HGP  consortium.
As the example illustrates, there is a range of institutions in
which innovation can be governed (see Table 1 for examples).
This includes, for example, the patent system, academic science,
open source and creative commons licenses, and also ad hoc con-
tracted frameworks, as in the HGP. Each framework or innovation
system treats knowledge and technology disclosure (e.g., sharing,
spillovers, transfers and reuse more generally) according to its own
particular rules and procedures (Table 1). Rather than focus on
the many details of disclosure policies within a given innovation
system, this paper considers an essential difference across innova-
tion systems: ﬁnal versus intermediate disclosure policies. Here, we
investigate how ﬁnal and intermediate disclosure policies – this key
difference distinguishing innovation systems – shapes innovation.
Thus, we attempt to better understand the comparative advantages
of these approaches and the innovation systems that embody them.
Traditional institutions tend to favor ﬁnal disclosure of an
innovation or problem-solving output that is completed or “work-
ing,” i.e. after the innovation-related problem solving process is
completed, such as patented inventions, working instantiations
of designs in product components or machinery used in larger
downstream systems, vetted academic contributions in the form
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Table  1
Illustrative examples of cumulative innovation systems, by disclosure policy.
Governance framework Unit of innovation
output/disclosure
Implementation of incentives Implementation of disclosure and
reuse
Final disclosure
Patent System A working invention Patents confer ﬁnite rights of exclusion, which
in principle may  enable property rights and
trade or, alternatively, monopoly supply. (e.g.,
Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 1972; Green and
Scotchmer, 1995; Bessen and Maskin, 2009)
Patent award leads to disclosure in the
public domain with general public
access once patent expires. Prior to
this, licensing or imperfect protections
enable reuse. (e.g., Kitch, 1977; Green
and Scotchmer, 1995; Cohen et al.,
2000; Arora et al., 2004; Chesbrough,
2003; Williams, 2013)
Academic Science A complete research
publication
Quality, number of publications and number of
citations are the basis of rewards in Science
(promotion, status, funding, peer esteem
honors and awards). Intrinsic and other
sources of motivation can also play a large role.
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Stern, 1994; Stephan,
1996; Aghion et al., 2008)
Publications are disclosed in the public
domain (i.e., academic journals,
working paper databases) whereupon
others, conditional on citation, can
reuse their content and ideas. (e.g.,
Cohen et al., 2000; Stephan, 1996;
Salter and Martin, 2001; Murray et al.,
2009; Bikard, 2014)
Ansari X-Prize for Suborbital
Space Flight (and other
public contests)
A complete, working
solution to the
challenge
Cash payoffs and public acclaim are on the
basis of rank-ordered outcomes based on
preannounced criteria. (e.g., Taylor, 1995;
Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Boudreau et al.,
2011; Murray et al. 2012)
Disclosure in prizes may, in principle
be dealt with any number of ways. In
this case, ownership over the winning
technology was retained by the
winning solution provider. (e.g., Moser
and Nicholas, 2013)
Apple AppStore (and other
multi-sided platforms)
An “App” The platform creates two-sided market-based
incentives to make sales to the large number of
users of Apple devices. (e.g., Bresnahan and
Greenstein, 1999; Rochet and Tirole, 2003;
Parker and Van Alstyne, 2010; Boudreau, 2012)
The upstream platform is, by design, a
technology intended to be reused and
built upon. (e.g., Baldwin and Clark,
2000; Boudreau, 2010; Parker and Van
Alstyne, 2010)
Intermediate disclosure
Open Source Projects A code contribution,
edit or bug report
Projects enlist contributors with intrinsic,
own-use or pecuniary motives, in addition to
those wishing to learn, afﬁliate or signal their
mastery through high quality contributions.
(e.g., Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lakhani and von
Hippel, 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Roberts
et al., 2006)
General Public licenses (GPL) impose
stringent requirements on those
distributing GPL-based code to
mandatorily disclose and grant rights
of access to others. (e.g., Lerner and
Tirole, 2002; Lessig, 1999)
Human  Genome Project
(Bermuda Principles)
The gene sequence. Public scientiﬁc institutions partaking in the
HGP were required to accede to Bermuda
principles as a condition of research funding.
(e.g., Contreras, 2011)
The Bermuda Principles required
public disclosure within 24 h of
discovery of sequence information.
(e.g., Williams, 2013)
Homebrew Computer Club
(and other collective
invention, “user” and
innovator communities)
The idea or technique Those drawn to participate in informal
associations and communities of innovators
may  be motivated by wide range of reasons,
including those related to learning, intrinsic
motivation, socialization and many more.
“Community” can also initiate an incentive to
reciprocate. (e.g., von Hippel, 1988; von Hippel
and von Krogh, 2003; Osterloh and Rota, 2007)
The typically informal nature of
communities leads to few formal
restrictions to disclosure and reuse.
However, informal rules and norms
and threat of sanction may  be the basis
for imposing conditions, such as
acknowledgments. (e.g., Allen, 1983;
Nuvolari, 2004; Fauchart and von
Hippel, 2008)
Foldit  Protein Folding Platform
(and other aggregative,
collaborative platforms)
The “fold” or
“contribution”
The Foldit interface is devised to entice an
intrinsic puzzle-solving response of
contributors through an online game. More
generally, collaborative and aggregative
platforms may mobilize effort through any
number of incentives in collaborations. (Khatib
1; Zh
rman
The assembled database is available to
scientists who study highest scoring
solutions and who can then proceed to
use these intermediate outputs as a
basis for developing academic
publications.
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n some integral form and so on (Table 1). Intermediate and
nal disclosure are distinguished in the ﬁrst instance by timing.
hereas ﬁnal disclosures necessarily occur upon (and often con-
iderably after) the completion of work, intermediate disclosure
ccurs continuously. Disclosure is further distinguished by form.
inal disclosures, by their deﬁnition, typically involve some stan-
ardized, integral, working and wholly resolved form of solution.
y contrast, intermediate disclosure can accommodate a greater
readth or smaller quanta of knowledge, as in partial and negative
esults, methods, data, progress updates and so forth.
We argue and test two main points. First, we argue that
ore readily promoting knowledge reuse through intermediateang and Zhu, 2011; Franzoni
n, 2014)
disclosure comes with the cost of diminished incentives, depressing
effort and participation – an “incentives-versus-reuse” trade-
off. We  clarify that this tradeoff is rooted in the timing, form
and contractibility of technology and knowledge reuse. Second,
intermediate and ﬁnal disclosure policies produce a qualitative
transformation in patterns and scope of “search” across different
approaches to addressing an innovation problem – both in terms of
choices by individual innovators and overall patterns in the popula-
tion of innovators. Final disclosure promotes greater independent,
“parallel” or uncorrelated experimentation across different inno-
vators (Nelson, 1961; Abernathy and Rosenbloom, 1969; Boudreau
et al., 2011); intermediate disclosure produces more coordinated
– and possibly convergent and overlapping – choices of solution
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Following earlier premises, we contend that all innovation sys-
tems are “open”, if by “open” we  mean they enable disclosure of
upstream knowledge and technology for reuse. Although endless K.J. Boudreau, K.R. Lakhani 
pproaches. These differences are shaped by the prospect of
educing cost and uncertainty in experimentation and by greater
ignaling (regarding the knowledge frontier and the actions of oth-
rs) under intermediate disclosure.
Whereas, within the economy, intermediate and ﬁnal disclo-
ure are associated with entirely different innovation systems, our
mpirical investigation makes inferences by varying the disclosure
olicy while holding other features of institutional design con-
tant. To do so, we implemented a ﬁeld experiment in a controlled,
synthetic” institutional environment. We  implemented the exper-
ment on an online platform that was built and customized to
ncorporate key research design features by TopCoder (a leading
eveloper of contest-based custom software and algorithm solu-
ions).
The design involved comparing randomly-assigned indepen-
ent groups of individuals working to develop and optimize a
ioinformatics algorithm under either disclosure regime. In all, 733
athematicians, software developers, scientists and data scientists
articipated over the two-week problem-solving period. Under
ntermediate disclosure, intermediate solutions developed in the
egular trial-and-error development process were instantaneously
atalogued and made available for inspection and reuse by other
articipants within the group. Under ﬁnal disclosure, intermediate
olutions were not disclosed until the end of the two-week develop-
ent period. Payoffs and rewards were on the basis of rank order of
olution performance within each independent group. We  observe
ne-grained measures of incentives and effort, solution approaches
nd the technical performance of solutions.
It should be emphasized that the experimental design is
ntended to reﬂect a population of prospective innovators and how
hey respond to the prospect of working under a given institutional
ramework. This creates the need for unusually large comparison
roups to be constructed from the 733 participants. A direct con-
equence and cost of this requirement is minimal replication in
he design. We  discuss this point at greater length herein. A second
oint deserving special emphasis is the research is intended to gen-
ralize insights in relation to a wide range of innovation systems
n the basis of the one (synthetic) institutional context presented
ere. Therefore, we caution that while the intermediate disclosure
egime produces higher quality problem-solving at lower cost in
his particular context, this is not a generalizable ﬁnding. The key
eneralizable insights reside in the tradeoffs we document.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we establish key
erms of reference with respect to disclosure policies in innova-
ion systems. In Section 3, we review related literature and develop
redictions. The experimental set-up, methods and data collection
re described in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6
resents results and analysis. Section 7 concludes.
. The role of disclosure policies in innovation
In this section, we establish our key terms of reference, ﬁrst
iscussing the cumulative innovation process and then deﬁning
uestions of disclosure more precisely.
.1. “Upstream” knowledge and “downstream” reuse
Scholarship in a range of disciplines has conceived of innova-
ion as a cumulative process whereby the frontiers of knowledge
nd production possibilities are advanced by successfully solv-
ng a series of problems (Kuhn, 1962; Sahal, 1985). In large part,
ew knowledge, innovation and technical advances are prod-
cts of a recombinatorial process (e.g. Weitzman, 1998; Fleming,
001), where existing “upstream” knowledge is built upon and
ecombined within an on-going stream of cumulative innovations,arch Policy 44 (2015) 4–19
including those that improve upon the original application and
perhaps others that open up new uses (Basalla, 1988). In aca-
demic science, for example, this takes the form of new advances
building upon and citing existing publications, presentations and
exchanges in meetings and seminars, etc. (Dasgupta and David,
1994). In industrial innovation, for example, competitors may learn
from and draw on the knowledge and technology of other ﬁrms
through some combination of licensing, involuntary knowledge
spillovers, movement of employees and so forth (e.g., Marx et al.,
2009; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Similarly, various instantia-
tions of open innovation systems rely on participants being able,
in their attempts to solve current problems and create new inven-
tions, to reuse prior contributors’ knowledge and technology (e.g.,
Chesbrough, 2003; von Hippel, 2005).
2.2. Disclosure, granting access and devolving control
Where innovating individuals or organizations possess distinct
comparative advantages, it will sometimes be productive to involve
multiple parties to innovate within the chain of cumulative innova-
tion (Green and Scotchmer, 1995). Therefore, central to cumulative
innovation is a need for upstream knowledge and technology to be
disclosed in order for downstream innovators to reuse and build
upon this work.
Our use of “disclosure” here should be understood as short-
hand for the idea of implementing a broader framework1 in which
upstream knowledge and technology are not just disclosed but
follow-on innovators are also granted access rights (Murray and
O’Mahony, 2007; Boudreau, 2010). For example, patents disclose
the designs of inventions in the public domain. But patents also
confer rights of exclusion to the patent owner; it is through licens-
ing that access is granted for reuse by downstream innovators.
Imperfect defensibility of patents can also lead to de facto access
through “leakage” and involuntary spillovers of knowledge. Anal-
ogously, “user innovation” requires that originating technologies
and ideas not only be disclosed, but also that users have rights of
access and reuse, typically via the “ﬁrst-sale doctrine” (Katz, 2014),
which grants inventors rights to adapt, change and modify existing
products without legal encumbrances. Furthermore, beyond pro-
viding access via a contractual framework, in the case of physical
materials there can be a need for investments in facilities and infra-
structure to enable transfer and downstream reuse (Stern, 2004;
Furman and Stern, 2011).
Disclosures and access typically impose certain conditions and
stipulations, include those related to use, sharing, further develop-
ment, modiﬁcation and commercialization (e.g., Gans and Murray,
2012). Stipulations may  concern issues such as payments, attri-
bution, responsibilities and restrictions of various kinds. Wholly
devolving control rights over upstream knowledge or technol-
ogy may  eliminate such restrictions and conditionality (Boudreau,
2010). Complete devolution of control rights, however, is rare. Even
in the case of open source software, rights of access and reuse
are only established by acceding to the General Public License
or like agreements, which place a great number of conditions on
sharing, further development, modiﬁcation and commercialization
(Raymond, 1999).
2.3. Intermediate versus ﬁnal disclosure policies1 We focus here on disclosure policies rather than strategic, voluntary disclosures
by  individual actors (e.g., Haeussler et al., 2009; Henkel and Baldwin, 2010)
/ Resea
d
c
t
I
ﬁ
t
u
t
p
t
m
m
r
p
b
v
i
W
2
(
i
m
I
n
e
i
i
p
n
(
3
m
i
v
ﬁ
W
3
m
f
o
a
s
p
f
a
t
s
s
a
i
2
u
i
t
t
1K.J. Boudreau, K.R. Lakhani 
etails distinguish different innovation systems (see Table 1), a
ategorical distinction can be made between systems implemen-
ing ﬁnal and intermediate disclosure policies. As discussed in the
ntroduction, innovation systems implementing intermediate or
nal disclosure can be distinguished by the timing and form of
he disclosure of the innovative output. Final disclosure occurs
pon the completion of work (and often considerably after) and
ypically involves some standardized and integral form of out-
ut. By contrast, intermediate disclosure occurs more continuously
hroughout the innovative problem solving process and can accom-
odate a greater range and varying quanta of knowledge.2
Perhaps the most common and inﬂuential example of inter-
ediate disclosure is open source software, in which code, bug
eports and test suites are instantly made available for develo-
ers to build upon and reuse in successive submissions to the code
ase (O’Mahony, 2003; von Krogh et al., 2003; von Hippel and
on Krogh, 2003). Intermediate disclosure practices have also been
mplemented in computer hardware (Osterloh and Rota, 2007),
ikipedia (Zhang and Zhu, 2011), synthetic biology (Torrance,
010), the Polymath Project for creating mathematical proofs
Gowers and Nielsen, 2009) and Netﬂix’s $1MM prize contest to
mprove its movie rating prediction algorithm, in which inter-
ediate solutions were disclosed in the course of the contest.
ntermediate disclosure is not just a modern, Internet-driven phe-
omenon. Ample case examples from the industrial revolution and
arly 20th century of particular technological advances describe
nstances of “collective invention” in which inventors making
ntermediate disclosures to one another of ideas and techniques
ropelled advances in blast furnace technology (Allen, 1983), Cor-
ish pumping engines, Bessemer steel, large-scale silk production
Nuvolari, 2004) and aviation technology (Meyer, 2013).
. Disclosure policies and innovation outcomes
In this section, we consider how implementing ﬁnal or inter-
ediate disclosure policies may  affect innovation. Our discussion
s in two parts. We  ﬁrst describe what we refer to as the incentives-
ersus-reuse tradeoff. We  then describe how intermediate versus
nal disclosure policies qualitatively transform the search process.
e develop predictions for the empirical analysis to follow.
.1. Disclosure policies, incentives and follow-on reuse
Creating ex ante incentives to make costly and risky invest-
ents and effort while simultaneously encouraging ex post or
ollow-on knowledge reuse (through disclosure) are two  goals3
f any innovation system (see Scotchmer (2004) and Table 1). In
ny one innovations system, the goals of incentives and reuse can
ometimes conﬂict and other times be complementary. For exam-
le, knowledge spillovers and leakage among competing ﬁrms
acilitates reuse, but may  harm incentives (Scotchmer, 2004). In
cademic science, greater reuse through citations might, by con-
rast, stimulate efforts and incentives (Stephan, 1996, 2012). In this
ection, rather than focus on incentives and reuse within a given
ystem, we instead consider how differences in disclosure policies
cross systems bear on innovation outcomes.
2 Our consideration of timing here differs from past research on questions of tim-
ng and breadth of disclosure (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Mukherjee and Stern,
009; Lerner, 2006; Moon, 2011; Gans and Murray, 2012) by examining, in partic-
lar, effects of disclosures before the creation of a ﬁnal innovation.
3 Other considerations may  include allocative interests or fairness and minimiz-
ng deadweight losses. Here, however, we  emphasize dynamic considerations of
echnical change and innovation, given our focus here on innovation processes and
hat such considerations are most central to advancing welfare in society (Solow,
957).rch Policy 44 (2015) 4–19 7
3.1.1. Intermediate disclosure and contractibility
As is well known, contractibility conditions are tenuous around
the transfer and reuse of knowledge and ideas (e.g., Arrow, 1971).
It is challenging, under the best of circumstances to assure con-
tractibility in the sense of assuring that disclosure and access
conditions are honored and proper rewards are conferred to the
originating innovator. The challenge of contractibility is so cen-
tral to innovation system design that the nuanced rules, laws,
procedures and even cultures and customs of any one system
can be readily interpreted in this light. For example, multi-party
exchange frameworks – as in patent pools, academic publishing,
standards organizations and biological research centers – avoid
the need for ad hoc bilateral negotiations and governance. Infor-
mal  governance can also supplement formal governance in order
to enforce rules of reuse and sharing (Fauchart and von Hippel,
2008). Proprietary platform technologies are even designed from
the ground up in a way  that enables access and reuse by large
numbers of downstream innovators without the need to relinquish
control or transfer knowledge of the inner workings of the plat-
form (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Boudreau, 2010; Parker and Van
Alstyne, 2010).
Most crucial to our arguments here are the cornerstones of
contractability, observability and veriﬁability (Hart, 1995). Inter-
mediate disclosure degrades observability and contractibility of
knowledge disclosure and reuse. This is because the delicate bal-
ance in the design of any innovation system can best function to
the extent that upstream knowledge being disclosed, transferred
and reused takes some completed, working, wholly integral form
– simply because this makes the quantum of knowledge transfer
more measurable and standardized.
Consider the academic science context, where the research
article is the commonly accepted and readily observed “unit of
innovative output.” Production of research articles is governed
by commonly understood requirements for format, content and
completeness. These outputs are even certiﬁed by the institutions
through peer review. Peer review is itself somewhat standard-
ized through a set of regular routines, given standard expectations
around the content of research articles. Simple counts of research
articles also even act as meaningful measures of journal quality
(impact factor as average numbers of citations) and researcher
quality (on the basis of publication counts, by journal type). Inter-
mediate disclosure will reduce these levels of observability and
veriﬁability if they imply less standardized, less measurable, less
certiﬁed, more commingled, more varied forms and proper attri-
bution is made more difﬁcult.
3.1.2. The “incentives-versus-reuse” tradeoff
In considering how incentives and reuse are affected by disclo-
sure policies, prior research has tended to consider these issues
separately, rather than at once; and this research also tends to con-
sider these issues within a given innovation system, rather than
in relation to different approaches to disclosure across altogether
different systems. Here, we  describe an “incentives-versus-reuse”
tradeoff associated with intermediate and ﬁnal disclosure, when
considering broader comparisons.
With respect to incentives, intermediate disclosure reduces con-
tractibility, as earlier described, reducing upstream innovators’
ability to impose conditions and stipulations on reuse. This includes
stipulations assuring recognition and rewards to the upstream
innovator. Intermediate disclosure therefore reduces incentives,
all else being equal.4 This claim is consistent with the popular
4 This presumes, for example, that lower appropriability is not somehow out-
weighed by beneﬁts of wider adoption and reuse by competing innovators, as
with say network effects (e.g., Cusumano et al., 1992), powerful complementarities
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iew that the absence of patents (a ﬁnal disclosure mechanism)
ight decrease incentives (Schankerman, 1998), which enjoys at
east some empirical support (Belleﬂamme, 2006). Note, this lower
ontractibility adds to what might already be depressed incen-
ives under any form of reuse – whether with intermediate or
nal disclosure, as dividing payoffs between upstream and down-
tream innovators can itself harm incentives (Scotchmer, 1991,
004; Green and Scotchmer, 1995).
Implications for follow-on reuse between ﬁnal and intermediate
isclosure are more straightforward. Intermediate disclosure – by
eﬁnition – creates the opportunity for earlier, more frequent and
ider ranging disclosures, with fewer restrictions on reuse than
oes ﬁnal disclosure.5 It immediately follows that intermediate dis-
losure enables greater reuse of a given upstream innovation, all
lse being equal.6
As straightforward as the logic of the “reuse” half of the
incentives-versus-reuse” tradeoff might be – i.e., all else being
qual, removing obstacles to disclosure indeed enables greater
euse – it remains difﬁcult to directly observe relevant all-
lse-being-equal empirical comparisons to illustrate this point.
onetheless, we can begin to appreciate the central role of follow-
n innovation and reuse under intermediate disclosure simply by
eferring to the numerous studies documenting their abundancy in
ontexts such as open source software projects (e.g.: von Krogh
t al., 2003), communities of inventors (e.g. Meyer, 2013), user
nnovator groups (e.g., von Hippel, 2005) and other intermediate
isclosure regimes.
Although follow-on reuse is often taken as a matter of fact in
esearch focused on intermediate disclosure regimes, innovators’
ncentives to enter, participate and exert effort in development is
aken as a “puzzle” given lower appropriability conditions (e.g.,
onaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002) – consis-
ent again with the incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff. In many
ases, the puzzle is clariﬁed by pointing to some form of com-
ensating mechanism that countervails any productivity losses
rom depressed incentives. For example, enlisting “many eyeballs”
Raymond, 1999) through globally distributed reach and highly
odular work streams can offset lost incentives in open source soft-
are projects. Lower contractibility and payoffs speciﬁcally related
o disclosures and reuse might also be offset by enlisting sources
f motivation not tied to transfers and reuse, such as intrinsic,
nd increasing returns in knowledge recombination(Weitzman, 1998; Bessen and
askin, 2009; Belenzon, 2012) or the establishment of a cooperative reciprocating
r  “sharing” equilibrium among those disclosing and recombining knowledge (e.g.,
llen, 1983).
5 Note that these arguments imply that contractibility is “good” for upstream
nnovators but “bad” for downstream reuse. This might seem a departure from
oasian reasoning, where the assignment of property rights and ability to write
ontracts can assure efﬁcient trades. However, even if a perfect contract for the
ransfer and reuse could be written, the downstream innovator might not be able to
ommit to the contract without ﬁrst engaging in trial-and-error experimentation to
ssess the value of an upstream input. Thus, the downstream innovator would need
 means of accessing this knowledge prior to assessing its value. Alternatively, under
ess than ideal Coasian conditions, this contention (of good for upstream incentives
nd  bad for downstream reuse) simply requires that imperfect contracts go some
easure towards guaranteeing upstream innovators’ payoffs, while adding transac-
ion  costs in downstream reuse relative to what would be the case in a less heavily
ontracted environment.
6 The all-else-being-equal qualiﬁcation is rather important here, as intermedi-
te disclosure could affect incentives in a way  that determines whether a given
pstream innovation appears in the ﬁrst place. It should also affect downstream
nnovator’s incentives to invest in “absorbing” and learning upstream knowledge
nd technology. Intermediate disclosure could also shape coordination and search
osts. For example, a published academic article (a ﬁnal disclosure) comes with the
alidation, certiﬁcation and screening of the peer review process. The selection pro-
ess of journals and the full development and articulation of contributions in an
rticle also help sort and categorize its content for other scholars to comprehend
nd situate within the torrent of academic research output.arch Policy 44 (2015) 4–19
pro-social, own-use and learning-by-doing motivations (Lakhani
and Wolf, 2005; Roberts et al., 2006). Further, research on open
source and user innovation routinely refer to populations of those
innovators as “communities” (Franke and Shah, 2003; von Hippel
and von Krogh, 2003; West and Lakhani, 2008; O’Mahony and
Lakhani, 2011), implying norms and socialization might compen-
sate by producing cooperative, reciprocating interactions rather
than competitive ones. In some cases, intermediate disclosure
regimes still involve attempts to tie payoffs to encourage effort and
disclosure, at least for small levels of effort. For example, Wikipedia
encourages “edits” (contributions and simultaneous disclosure) via
the motivations of participants to signal their expertise to a wider
audience of users (Zhang and Zhu, 2011). The small size of individ-
ual intermediate, partial contributions might also relieve the need
for herculean efforts by any one individual.
Beyond papers focusing on patterns associated with particular
disclosure policies, a small stream of recent papers attempts to
compare follow-on reuse when disclosure policies vary within a
given innovation system. None precisely relates to intermediate
versus ﬁnal disclosure, but nonetheless offers some corroborat-
ing insight. For example, several papers have begun to investigate
effects of patents, a ﬁnal disclosure mechanism, on follow-on reuse
(relative to no patents, at all). The arguments presented here would
predict that patents, as a ﬁnal disclosure regime, should retard dis-
closure and reuse of a given upstream innovation all else being
equal, relative to rates of reuse in intermediate disclosure. How-
ever, rather than simply ﬁnding patents generate little reuse, these
studies fail to ﬁnd any evidence whatsoever that patents produce
an increase of reuse at all – and most data analyzed thus far sug-
gests a decrease (Huang and Murray, 2009; Murray and Stern, 2007;
Williams, 2013; Sampat and Williams, 2014).7 Thus, rather than
promoting reuse via property rights and a “market for ideas” (Kitch,
1977; Arora et al., 2004) at least these existing comparisons sug-
gest imperfections and transaction costs of patents (Heller and
Eisenberg, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Bessen, 2004) that lead
them to support fewer disclosures than even our theory would
allow for. More broadly, these results corroborate our contention
that hindrances and conditions placed on disclosure can have large
negative implications for on-going reuse.
Perhaps works that are closest to our reuse “half” of the
incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff, are those by Furman and Stern
(2011) and Boudreau (2010). Furman and Stern (2011) show that
the establishment of biological resource centers as an infrastructure
and contracting framework to grant access to research materials
increases reuse by wide margins. Boudreau (2010) analogously
shows that both granting access to and devolving control over
upstream operating system platforms in personal digital assistants
and smartphones accelerates reuse in downstream development
sizably increases building of downstream products on top of those
platforms.
We summarize the preceding arguments in the following pre-
diction.
Prediction 1 (“Incentives-versus-Reuse” Tradeoff): Implemen-
ting an intermediate rather than ﬁnal disclosure policy leads to
lower incentives but greater follow-on reuse.
7 Williams (2013) is exceptional in ﬁnding zero effect of patents on disclosure. Her
interpretation is that given there is zero effect on disclosure, the effect of patents
on  reuse can be disregarded in efﬁciency assessments of patents. Our  theory and
arguments instead would suggest that the absence of an effect on reuse should
instead be regarded as cause to question to efﬁcacy of the disclosure mechanism in
patents. It should be noted too that Galasso and Schankerman (2013) ﬁnd consider-
able variation from industry to industry, even in their relatively selected subsample
of  inventions that are invalidated, suggesting considerable need for caution in inter-
preting the existing evidence.
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.2. Disclosure policies and search for solutions
The earlier incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff draws on litera-
ures that implicitly conceptualize the innovation process as a
production function” where upstream knowledge or technology
erves as an “input” along with effort and investment in determin-
ng the level of downstream innovation that results. In this section,
e consider that innovation performance is also shaped by the the
earch for problem-solving approach. We  develop predictions in
elation to disclosure policies.
.2.1. Alternative approaches to solving problems
Innovation problems that involve making large numbers of
nteracting decisions are, by their nature, complex and uncertain
 and therefore require search to ﬁnd a solution (Simon, 1962). For
xample, in aeronautical engineering, landing gear design involves
ets of decisions related to a great many interrelated parame-
ers (e.g., the number and conﬁguration of wheels, gear design,
etraction and extension method, etc.) that trade off various per-
ormance criteria (e.g., drag, weight, cost, maintenance, reliability,
tc.). Analog of such complex innovation and problem-solving exist
n science, technology, software, artistic composition, etc.
In principle, there may  be multiple solutions that meet some
riteria – although perhaps trading off aspects of performance in
ifferent ways. Where the individual decisions (around particular
arameters of a solution) are complementary and “go together”
Rosenberg, 1982) altogether different solution approaches can
xist (e.g., a ﬁxed landing gear goes together with the choice
f aerodynamic covers for wheels, whereas a retractable landing
ear goes together with modiﬁcations to the fuselage). Innova-
ion thus tends to proceed as a search for approaches and then
s a search for optimal solutions within a given approach. (This
s akin to search on different “hills” within a “rugged land-
cape” (Kauffmann, 1993; Levinthal, 1997), or “exploration versus
xploitation” (March, 1991)). In the history of aeronautical design,
anding gear design proceeded in at least four distinct and par-
llel approaches until ﬁnally the retractable landing became the
referred approach (Vincenti, 1994). Landing gear design proceeds
oday within that same basic approach, with continuing incremen-
al improvements.8 This notion of search is explored in a range
f research traditions beyond just innovation, including artiﬁcial
ntelligence, psychology, biology, evolution, organizational learn-
ng and others (e.g., Cyert and March, 1963; Newell and Simon,
972; Simon, 1962; March, 1991; Levinthal, 1997).
To the extent that innovation and problem solving is shrouded in
ncertainty, individual problem solvers may  initiate search accord-
ng to their own initial stock of knowledge and beliefs (Rosenkopf
nd Nerkar, 2001; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Trial-and-error
xperimentation then provides feedback and insight – learning –
ccumulating upon an innovator’s initial stock of knowledge. Given
onstraints of uncertainty and bounded rationality, the choice of
earch direction can be inﬂuenced by some combination of heuris-
ics (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982), theoretical understandings
Fleming and Sorenson, 2004), analogies from comparable situa-
ions (Gavetti et al., 2005) and the problem solver’s own initial
ndowment of knowledge and experience. In addition, problem
olvers may  not be entirely isolated, autonomous and independent
f one another. They may  and often are, searching whilst others do
he same. This provides an opportunity to observe the activities
nd outcomes of the experimentation of other problem solvers.
epending on the payoff structure, observing others’ action can
8 Bijker et al. (1987) document multiple simultaneous approaches in a range of
echnologies including bicycles, synthetic dye chemistry and ship-building.rch Policy 44 (2015) 4–19 9
also inﬂuence expected returns of making investments in given
directions.
3.2.2. Disclosure and innovative search
The earlier incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff, on its own, sug-
gests that the higher incentives of ﬁnal disclosure might be
associated with higher experimentation – inasmuch as higher
incentives and effort translate to greater search efforts. Here we
argue that disclosure policies should more fundamentally trans-
form patterns of search.
There will be a greater degree of independence in the choice
of search approach across innovators under ﬁnal disclosure, where
a steady stream of intermediate updating and observation of oth-
ers’ actions and choices is not possible. At the population level, this
may  imply some degree of “parallel” or uncorrelated search, inas-
much as individuals maintain some level of ignorance regarding
outcomes of each other’s trial-and-error search process (Nelson,
1961; Boudreau et al., 2011).
In the case of intermediate disclosures, a steadier stream of
updates has the potential to result in far more “coordinated” or
correlated responses, if individual problem solvers can observe
and respond systematically to their own experimentation out-
comes and to those of others. Intermediate disclosure, not only
increases the immediacy and extent of transfers and reuse, but
also telegraphs information about the existence and potential of
alternative approaches. More informed and coordinated searching
could potentially produce deliberately differentiated search paths,
as when competing innovators expect higher returns from staking
out new ground than from engaging in overlapping experiments
(cf. Murray et al., 2009; Acemoglu, 2012). Following this argu-
ment, it is possible that a coordinated search could lead to greater
diversity in solution approaches than that generated by indepen-
dent experimentation. However, a countervailing argument, is that
converging on established solution approaches economizes search
costs and reduces uncertainty – creating incentives to replicate and
incrementally extend what has been done. Following the weight
of historical evidence – indicating a general tendency to conver-
gent trajectories, dominant designs and the emergence of scientiﬁc
paradigms (e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Dosi,
1982), we  make the following prediction:
Prediction2  (“Independent-versus-Convergent Search”):
Implementing an intermediate rather than ﬁnal disclosure
policy leads innovators to tend to converge towards success-
ful solution approaches and to engage in a lesser degree of
independent experimentation.
4. Experimental design
To study the questions raised in the earlier discussion we  imple-
ment a synthetic innovation system in a “Petri dish,” applying
different disclosure policies in different treatments. At the same
time, we  hold constant the problem addressed and the composition
and number of participants working under different treatments so
as to infer ceteris paribus effects of disclosure policies.
The research question and our objectives place relatively high
restrictions on the research context. We  needed an exceptionally
highly controlled environment that would enable us to pre-
cisely implement distinct disclosure policies while controlling all
other aspects of the institutional context and observing relevant
micro-measures (i.e., effort, problem-solving performance and the
particular solution approaches pursued).The experiment was  car-
ried out over two  weeks on the online software development
platform of TopCoder, the leading platform for developing software
and algorithmic solutions as a series of contests. The platform has
existing communications and payment systems and a membership
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f elite software and algorithm problem-solvers. We  worked
losely with TopCoder executives and technologists to modify the
latform to implement the features of the experimental design, the
articulars of which we describe here.
.1. Sign-up phase and random assignment to independent
roups
Subjects were recruited from the TopCoder platform’s exist-
ng membership of software and algorithm programmers, the
xperiment being included as part of the regular stream of listed
challenges” members can sign up for and participate in. The post-
ng indicated that the challenge would feature an algorithmic
ptimization solution related to genomics, the solution to which
as sought by Harvard Medical School (from which the problem
ad been sourced, see Section 4.2), that the total prize pool would
e $6000.00 and that the exercise was also being used for research
urposes. The call for participation did not describe what particular
roblem would be solved.
In response to our call for participation, 733 TopCoder members
igned up for the experiment. Roughly half (44%) were profession-
ls, the remainder were students. Participants from India (20%), the
nited States (16%), China (9%) and Russia (9%) accounted for more
han half of a pool that represented 69 countries.
Our primary goal in the experiment was to observe differences
ot only across individuals working under different disclosure poli-
ies, but also differences across the groups, as a whole. For example,
atterns of learning and innovation in each group is a collective
utcome, at least as much as it is can be regarded at the individual
evel. In this sense, it was  important to design an environment –
ynthetic as it might be – that would represent a population of cre-
tive problem-solvers could, in the presence of a given institutional
ramework, might elect to participate in the innovation process or
therwise devote their attention to outside options (much like the
ase in our real-world innovation systems). This, however, implies
he need to create large comparison groups of prospective entrants,
o enable us to observe entry, non-entry and the consequences of
nteractions among individual subjects who do enter and actively
articipate.
With these points in mind, we constructed a minimum – only
wo – main experimental comparison groups to maximize their
ize: the “Intermediate Disclosure” and “Final Disclosure” regimes.
 cost of large groups is a loss of replication, with just one trial per
reatment. As a means of providing greater validation to the results,
e constructed a third, supplementary regime to better assure that
ur main comparison groups were not somehow eccentric. In this
Mixed” regime, intermediate disclosure was permitted in the sec-
nd but not the ﬁrst week of the experiment. In reporting results,
e focus on the main comparison groups and return to the Mixed
egime to ﬁnd they corroborate main results.
In creating three equally-sized (Intermediate Disclosure was
ssigned 245 treatments; Final Disclosure and Mixed treatments
ere each assigned 244 subjects), independent groups of simi-
ar composition, we randomized, but simultaneously matched on
kills by rank-ordering participants according to skill-ratings and
hen randomly assigned descending triplets of roughly equal skill
atings. We  are able to observe skills, as the TopCoder platform
rovides participants’ skill ratings, formulated via an Elo-based sys-
em (Maas and Wagenmakers, 2005). This rating estimates skill on
he basis of historical performance in similar algorithmic problem-
olving exercises.9
9 The average participant had engaged in dozens of problems prior to the exper-
ment. The Elo system is standard in a range of contexts from chess grandmasterarch Policy 44 (2015) 4–19
4.2. Problem-solving and development phase
All development and interaction occurred on the online
platform. Once assignment of individuals was completed and
problem-solving was  set to begin, a series of information was
immediately revealed. Subjects were given the problem statement,
together with a description of how solution accuracy and speed
would translate into quantitive solution scores. At the same time,
the identities (“handles”) of all other subjects in the same treatment
group were revealed.
4.2.1. The problem
The innovation problem was to develop de novo solutions in
computer code to a problem sourced from researchers at Harvard
Medical School, speciﬁcally, to design a bioinformatics algorithm
to compare and annotate a large series of genomic sequences.
The problem involved processing large amounts of data, accurately
annotating the sequencing while minimizing transcription errors,
solving within constrained computational resources (utilizing only
an off-the-shelf computer) and minimizing the amount of time. A
detailed description of the scientiﬁc features of the problem and
scoring of solutions is described by Lakhani et al. (2013).
The problem we selected sits at the intersection of software
development, mathematics, computer science and biology, is non-
trivial and challenging and is a sort of computational optimization
problem that involves iterative solution development and ongo-
ing incremental gains rather than a ﬁnal analytical solution that is
either correct or incorrect. The focus on algorithm development
enables us to treat intermediate solutions as primary inputs to
subsequent development within a trial-and-error learning process.
Working in digital format also enables solutions to be codiﬁed and
recorded in computer instructions and evaluated by an automated
system. The algorithmic setting also enabled us to devise a common,
automated and precise measure of quality. Such advantages would
not be possible were we to use a non-digital context. Further, the
speciﬁc problem is highly salient in the scientiﬁc literature, having
ﬁrst been addressed when gene sequencing got underway (Altschul
et al., 1990). More generally, the problem is also representative of
complex, data-intensive numerical optimization problems.
4.2.2. Work environment, scoring and information
Subjects worked through the platform’s “heads-up” interface
screen on which development could be performed in a range of
computer languages. Subjects received direct feedback by submit-
ting their algorithm designs to the platform for assessment by the
automated test suite and observing solution scores. (It was not
possible to receive direct feedback on the quality of submissions
“off line.”) The main task required subjects to write code to max-
imize accuracy and minimize time in identifying the originating
gene segments that formed a particular genomic sequence. Each
code submission had to evaluate 100,000 genomic sequences with
the quality score determined as a linear combination of speed and
accuracy. Although the explicit scoring model was shared with
participants, practically speaking, it was only through submitting
intermediate working solutions to the platform in trial-and-error
fashion that participants could determine their scores and whether
improvements could be made.4.2.3. Disclosure regimes
The differences of central interest are those related to the dis-
closure policies that were implemented across the independent
tournaments to US College Bowl systems to the National Scrabble Association and
European Go Federation.
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missions. As a supplementary measure of effort exerted, apart
from number of submissions, we  also administered a survey afterK.J. Boudreau, K.R. Lakhani 
roups. Subjects were informed of procedures within their respec-
ive regimes, but not of procedures of other groups or that there
ould be differences across groups.
.2.4. Final disclosure
Final Disclosure is the simplest case. No communications or
haring facilities were enabled on the platform for this treat-
ent. Individuals were also instructed that interacting with other
ompetitors off the platform would result in immediate disquali-
cation of all involved. Participants simply worked on their own
nd submitted their solutions for scoring. Although solutions were
ot disclosed, we followed TopCoder’s insistence that the system
isplay scores and rank ordering of participants throughout the
xperiment.10
.2.5. Intermediate disclosure
In Intermediate Disclosure all solutions submitted by subjects
n the trial-and-error development process were immediately dis-
losed to other participants in the same treatment group. This was
one via the same main “heads-up” display interface used to con-
uct software development. All submitted intermediate solutions,
dentiﬁed by score, submitter and time of submission, were listed
nd available to participants in their entirety (i.e., source code) by
imply clicking on the relevant entry in the list. The implemented
ystem of disclosure should thus be understood as relatively simple
nd frictionless.
.2.6. Mixed regime
In the Mixed regime, intended to supplement our main com-
arisons, the ﬁrst week followed the rules and procedures of Final
isclosure (i.e., no disclosures), the second week followed the rules
nd procedures of Intermediate Disclosure (i.e., all solutions from
he ﬁrst week was revealed along with any subsequent solutions
uring the second week).
.3. Payoffs and rewards phase
Our primary interest in this experiment is to examine effects
f variation in disclosure policies, nonetheless we deﬁne a ﬁxed
nderlying institutional design held constant across treatments.
articularly relevant is, of course, the payoff structure.
.3.1. Payoffs in ﬁnal disclosure
Payoffs were tied to quality of the solutions developed, based on
he precise quantitative scoring enabled by platform submissions.
n general, payoffs to an innovation problem can, for example, go
o the top performing solutions, as in winner-take-all outcomes.
uch is the case where only the very best solution is desired and
here is no need for variety of solutions or solution approaches
n addressing a particular problem. However, more generally, we
ften see some returns to more than just one solution for a given
roblem (e.g., competition in academia, industrial competition,
rize contests, etc.). For this reason, we chose an arbitrarily small
umber (5) of prizes, monotonically varying in size with rank. (We
ere also encouraged to follow this design by TopCoder executives,
n the basis of their experience.) In Final Disclosure, the top ﬁve
ositions were allocated a total of $1000 in payoffs ($500, $250,
125, $75 and $50) at the end of each of the two weeks, i.e., a
otal of $2000. (The particular amounts were chosen under the
dvice of TopCoder executives, given the nature of the problem and
10 This creates the possibility of updating and consequent decision-making
hroughout the contest. However, the experiment was not designed to derive
nferences in relation to any dynamic adjustments. We  focus on cross-sectional
omparisons.rch Policy 44 (2015) 4–19 11
given our interest in eliciting wide participation. TopCoder execu-
tives also recommended we break up payments over two weeks,
rather than confer rewards only at the end, as a means of main-
taining engagement and participation across the entire process,
enabling us to observe a longer period of experimentation and
improvement.11) Speciﬁcally, payoffs were based upon the ﬁnal,
last submissions made by each subject, each week. Top ranking
subjects were also publicly announced on the TopCoder website.
Therefore, implicit, reputational payoffs accompanied monetary
payoffs.
4.3.2. Payoffs in intermediate disclosure
In Intermediate Disclosure we created an environment and
framework in which both upstream problem-solvers and down-
stream providers of superior ﬁnal solutions were conferred payoffs
– maintaining the same overall budget as in Final Disclosure ($1,000
per week). We  chose an arbitrary division of payoffs between
ﬁnal solution providers and upstream innovators of one-half. (see
Green and Scotchmer (1995) for a more complete discussion of the
theoretical considerations in allocating shares.) Therefore, in Inter-
mediate Disclosure, the top ﬁve ranked solution providers were
allocated a total at the end of each week of $500 ($250, $125, $62.50,
$37.50 and $25), akin to the Final Disclosure case but half the mag-
nitudes. The remaining payoff budget was allocated to upstream
innovators.
In submitting any given solution, downstream innovators
were instructed to list solutions they examined (i.e., clicked
on through the web interface) and somehow drew upon in
improving their own  solutions. This involved listing the name
of creator of solution that was  drawn upon and answering the
question of what fraction (percentage) of the solution drew
on the identiﬁed prior submission. The response of this ques-
tion had no bearing on payoffs to the downstream innovator
(in the instance they would go on to secure one of the top
ﬁve positions). The sum totals of percentage responses for the
identiﬁed upstream contributors to the top ﬁve ranked solu-
tions where then used to generate a rank order of all upstream
innovators. Cash payoffs were then conferred to these upstream
innovators in the same magnitudes as the top ﬁnal solution
providers (i.e., $500, $250, $125, $75 and $50). This payoff
structure therefore implements a framework in which rewards
are allocated to high-performing upstream solutions. However,
stipulations of downstream use including payoffs and rewards
associated with reuse are minimal in a low contractibility
environment.12
Fig. 1 summarizes timing and payoffs across the distinct com-
parison groups in the experiment.
5. Data and variables
The data set we  analyze here was constructed from several
data sources. First, the experimental setup provides us with obser-
vational data subjects’ decision to participate and make at leastall coding activity was completed and before ﬁnal results were
11 An alternative design would entail a lump disclosure of all ﬁrst-week solutions
at  the end of the ﬁrst week. However, we elected to implement the simpler design
as  it did not bear on predictions in Section 3. There is clearly scope for examining
more nuanced dynamics in future research.
12 Note, here we  do not generate low contractibility by varying the form of disclo-
sures (see Section 2.3), but rather we directly implement low contractibility in how
we  deﬁne the experimental framework.
12 K.J. Boudreau, K.R. Lakhani / Research Policy 44 (2015) 4–19
Table  2
Description of variables.
Variable Unit of observation Description
Participation Subject An indicator variable switched on for all subjects submitting at least one solution.
Submissions Subject Count of the number of solutions submitted by a subject over the course of the two-week experiment.
No.  disclosures Subject Count of the number of past solutions for which the subject “clicked through” to see the complete code.
Submission quality Solution submission An automated precise measure of the quality of a each solution submission.
Programming language Solution submission A wide variety of programming languages were admissible. This ﬁeld records the name of the language.
ribing
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and signiﬁcance of this difference increase when controlling for
Table 3
Elemental techniques used in solutions.
Method Description
1 Filtering by unmapped alignment scone (Hamming
distance): Compare the query string against strings from sets
A,  B and/or C, trying various possible offsets.
2 Filtering by comparing frequencies of hashed chunks: For
both the query string and strings from A, B and/or C. move a
sliding window across the string and make a frequency table of
the  chunks that appear in the window, optionally after hashing
the chunks. Select the best match(es) between the frequency
table obtained from the query and those from the carpus.
3  Dynamic programming: Compute the actual Levanshtein
distance between a portion of the query and strings from sets
A,  B and/or C.Solution approach Solution submission A 10-digit binary code desc
ote. The data set relates to 733 subjects, of which 122 are submitters, submitting 
ade public, asking participants to report the number of hours
orked over the two-week period. The experimental setup also
llowed us to record subjects’ clicking through to examine dis-
losed code submissions of other participants under Intermediate
isclosure. Key variables in the analysis are described in Table 2.
escriptive statistics of variables are provided in the analysis to
ollow.
We also collected the software code for each submission. From
his, we recorded the programming language utilized. Further, we
ired three Ph.D. experts to uncover and systematically document
he technical solution approaches used in each of the 654 submis-
ions. The experts ﬁrst reviewed the submissions to infer that across
he body of solutions, subsets of distinct combinations of ten ele-
ental computational techniques were used (Table 3, see Lakhani
t al. (2013) for more details on the approaches developed in the
xperiment). Each solution was then coded according to whether
ach of these techniques were employed, leading each solution to
e encoded as a 10 digit binary code. Across each of the submissions,
he experts identiﬁed 56 distinct 10-digit combinations or solution
pproaches. Consistent with the innovation literature’s identiﬁca-
ion of novel approaches as combinations of distinct knowledge sets
Fleming, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001), unique combinations
f methods can be understood to represent distinct approaches to
arying degrees, while there is still considerable variation in the
articular implementation and quality across individual solutions
ithin a given approach.
. Results and analysis
Before proceeding to assessing evidence in relation to Predic-
ions 1 and 2, Fig. 2 ﬁrst provides a broad orienting overview of
roblem-solving patterns in the main comparison groups, show-
ng submissions by quality, over time. The graphs also trace the
aximal frontier (black) and moving averages (red) lines. Table 4
rovides a broader overview of readily-observable cross-sectional
ifferences between Intermediate Disclosure and Final Disclosure
utcomes that we will discuss in greater detail in the discussion to
ollow.
Fig. 1. Overview of experimental sequence. which among 10 elemental techniques are used in a given solution submission.
lutions.
6.1. Findings on the incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff
Results presented in this section relate to Prediction 1. We
examine evidence in relation to either side of the tradeoff in turn.
6.1.1. Effort and incentives
Evidence of lower levels of participation and effort exerted
under Intermediate Disclosure are consistent with our prediction
of lower incentives under Intermediate Disclosure, as in Prediction
1. (See “’Entry’ Participation and Effort” in Table 4.) The frac-
tion of subjects choosing to “enter” and actively participate in
problem-solving (i.e., subjects submitting at least one solution)
was signiﬁcantly – 26% – lower in Intermediate Disclosure than
in Final Disclosure, with 14% entering and actively participating in
Intermediate Disclosure versus 19% in Final Disclosure. Precision4  Dynamic programming extended to more than one section
(A,  E, C) at once: Extend the dynamic programming
Levenshtein distance computation to ﬁnd the optimal edit
distance between (a portion of) the query and all possible
A  + B, B + C or A + B + C combinations.
5 Bit optimizations: Use bitwise arithmetic to operate or
multiple characters at a time.
6 SEE optimizations: Use Streaming SIMB Extensions (a CPU
instruction set enabling single-instruction multiple-data
(SIMD) parallelization) to process up to 16 characters or
strings at once.
7 Reﬁnement of choices after ﬁnding initial solution: As a
post-processing step, hold two of the three selections ﬁxed
and reoptimize the third.
8 Fast approximation of edit distance in well-matched
regions: Use restricted dynamic programming. Hamming
distance or variants thereof to speed up the cumputation.
9  Precomputation of statistics on the string corpus: Perform
ofﬂine analysis of the provided sets A, B and C, and use the data
obtained for decision making in the algorithm.
10  Explicitly prefer shorter B strings: In heuristic approaches,
give bonuses to shorter strings from set B (which empirically
have greater likelihood of producing high scores).
K.J. Boudreau, K.R. Lakhani / Research Policy 44 (2015) 4–19 13
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Fig. 2. Overview of solution submissions over time, by disclosure policy (submissions, ﬁtted mean and maximal envelope shown).
Table 4
Overview of differences in outcomes across ﬁnal disclosure and intermediate disclosure.
Final disclosure Intermediate disclosure
Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
No. subjects assigned: 245 244
“Entry”, participation and effort
No. active participants/submitters 46 33
Prob{Submitting}  .19 (.01) .14 (.01)
No.  submissions 319 99
Submissions/active participant 6.93 (.42) 3.90 (.14)
Examinations of intermediate solutions
No. examinations of intermediate solutions N/A 1359
No.  examinations by submitters 1024
No.  submitters examining 30
Prob{Submitter examining} .91 (.01)
No.  solutions examined per examining submitter 34.13 (1.79)
No.  examinations by non-submitters 335
No.  non-submitters examining 46
Prob{Non-submitter examining} .22 (.01)
No.  solutions examined per examining non-submitter 7.28 (.5)
Solution approaches
No. solution approaches 27 19
Unique  (to Submitter) approaches per submitter 1.96 (.07) 1.67 (.06)
Unique (to Group) approaches per submitter .59 (.07) .58 (.06)
Unique approaches per submission .08 (.00) .19 (.01)
Problem-solving performance [ﬁnal scores]
Max 71 100
q90  47 94
q75  24 38
Median 13 11
q25  5 5
s
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e
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d
aq10  5 
Min  0 
kill levels and other subject covariates, without altering the point
stimate of the difference (not reported).13
Those who did participate under Intermediate Disclosure also
xerted lower effort, despite facing fewer other active participants
13 The data suggests results are driven by “treatment effects” and behaviors rather
han “selection effects” and composition. For example, we  found no statistical evi-
ence of differences in distributions of skills, industry, areas of technical interest,
ge  and self-reported source of motivation for participating on the platform.2
0
as competitors. The number of submissions per participant was
56% lower in Intermediate Disclosure than in Final Disclosure (3.9
versus 6.9 solution submissions, a difference signiﬁcant at p = 1%).
Our other measure of effort – the number of self-reported hours
worked over the two  weeks (Section 5) – is also lower in Interme-
diate Disclosure – 10.0 versus 14.1 hours, a difference signiﬁcant
at p = 1%, based on a 60% response rate. (Precision and signiﬁcance
of these differences again become greater still when controlling
for skill level while not changing estimated magnitude of dif-
ferences.) Therefore apart from considerably more participants
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ntering to engage in problem-solving under Final Disclosure, each
ctive participant also exerts considerably greater effort. In total,
ntermediate disclosure produces 99 solution submissions in rela-
ion to 319 produced under Final Disclosures.14 Taken together,15
e interpret patterns of lower entry and active participation, lower
ours worked and lower numbers of submissions as consistent with
ower incentives associated with Intermediate Disclosure.
.1.2. Reuse of intermediate solutions
Intermediate Disclosure, by deﬁnition, enabled intermediate
isclosures and reuse whereas Final Disclosure did not. It neces-
arily follows that the reuse half of the “incentives-versus-reuse”
radeoff holds (Section 3.1).
Beyond simply being greater than zero, we ﬁnd that disclo-
ures and reuse in this environment were widespread and frequent.
n total, 30 of the 33 active participants submitting at least one
olution in Intermediate Disclosure examined a total of 1,024 inter-
ediate solutions, or 34.1 on average (std. dev. = 28.0). This is
onsistent with the use of a relatively frictionless (“click-through”)
ystem, an ease of reviewing these intermediate solutions, the focus
f all parties on the same problem and thus, an expectation of
eturns to reviewing intermediate solutions. Early and highest-
coring, solutions elicited the greatest number of examinations.
ncidences steadily declined over the two-week duration, with
our-ﬁfths of examinations of prior solutions occurring in the ﬁrst
eek of the experiment.
It was also the case that many subjects who did not eventually
nter and participate also examined solutions, 44, examined inter-
ediate solutions of others. However they examined many fewer
.3 on average (std. dev. = 8.5). This might be explained in relation
o curiousity or an interest in learning. It is also plausible that some
f these non-submitters might have decided not to submit upon
aving reviewed others’ solutions.
.2. Findings on differences in the innovation search process
Results presented in this section relate to Prediction 2.
.2.1. Performance patterns and trajectories
As a ﬁrst approach to inferring the nature of search in either
egime, we contrast the performance trajectories of individual
ubmitters, as in Fig. 3, by connecting the dots representing submis-
ions by the same submitter. Perhaps more than any other ﬁgure
r table in the paper, this ﬁgure reveals the workings of our two
ain predictions at once in inﬂuencing innovation outcomes. (Par-icipants who did not submit solutions do not appear.)
Patterns under Final Disclosure, in the left panel of Fig. 3, are
nherently the most difﬁcult to read. There are more numerous
ines and dots and seemingly more erratic, less regular patterns.
14 We should qualify this statement by noting that notwithstanding the large dif-
erential, even 99 solutions should be regarded as a (very) high number in relation to
he  level of usual level of attention and publishing around comparable algorithmic
roblems in genomics in recent decades.
15 The measure of number of submissions has the appeal of being observational
ata, whereas hours worked is closest to a direct measure of effort level but is self-
eported. The 29% drop in number of hours worked, however, is less susceptible to
ther factors’ inﬂuence than is the 56% drop in numbers of submissions in Intermedi-
te Disclosure. For example, subjects might delay submissions, foregoing a measure
f  trial-and-error feedback, to limit undesired disclosures. Public disclosure of oth-
rs’ solutions information regarding the efﬁcacy of different approaches might also
educe the information value of making one’s own  submissions, while increasing
he information value to simply studying prior solutions. The sharing of informa-
ion regarding past solutions even to non-entrants might also have shaped decisions
o  enter either upward or downward, if this further informed their beliefs regarding
heir possible success. Alternatively, the reuse of prior solutions could facilitate and
asten submissions.arch Policy 44 (2015) 4–19
The greater number of lines and dots follows the earlier discussion
of higher incentives, participation and effort (Section 6.1). Beyond
a slight, if not entirely general tendency for individual performance
trajectories to increase over time, some start high, others low,
at times declining, at times increasing. There is not clear indica-
tion of correlated or coincident perturbations across submitters.
This results in a high frequency of solutions distributed relatively
evenly across the performance spectrum overall and in every time
period (Fig. 3). These patterns are consistent with independent
trial-and-error learning and experimentation occurring under Final
Disclosure, as theorized in Section 3.2.
Patterns under Intermediate Disclosure, in the right panel of
Fig. 3, starkly contrast with those of Final Disclosure. Differences
begin with there simply being fewer trajectories and fewer indi-
vidual submissions. Rather than the up-and-down trajectories of
Final Disclosure, we observe laminar, smooth patterns, ascending
together. Individuals’ trajectories (save for those of a handful of low
scoring outliers) also cluster on the maximal performance enve-
lope and increasingly do so over time. These patterns are consistent
with greater coordinated patterns of learning, experimentation and
advance across subjects in a collective process of cumulative inno-
vation. In this, the shape of trajectories suggest also a tendency
towards convergence rather than differentiation.
Thus, these patterns documented in Fig. 3 are consistent with
Prediction 2.
6.2.2. Diversity of solution approaches
An added perspective unto Prediction 2 is provided by data on
solution approaches (i.e., combinations of the 10 elemental tech-
niques, see Section 5). These data afﬁrm the earlier suggestion of a
greater tendency to coordination in the form of convergence rather
than divergence in the case of Intermediate Disclosure.
Fewer solution approaches were tried by the overall group of
submitters in Intermediate Disclosure. A total of 19 unique solu-
tion approaches were developed under Intermediate Disclosure
whereas 27 unique solution approaches were developed under
Final Disclosure (i.e., 42% fewer in Intermediate Disclosure). Fig. 4
presents the accumulation of distinct solution approaches over
time. The lines never cross, indicating there were always a greater
number of approaches attempted in Final Disclosure throughout
the entire exercise. In Intermediate Disclosure, apart from fewer
overall solutions (99 versus 319) and fewer solution approaches
(19 versus 27), there were fewer programming languages used. In
Intermediate Disclosure, three languages (C#, C++ and Java) were
used; in Final Disclosure these languages and two  more were used
(Python and Visual Basic).
It remains possible, nonetheless, that lower levels of experi-
mentation and diversity are simply the result of lower incentives
and effort exerted under Intermediate disclosure. It is difﬁcult to
entirely rule this possibility out and we should expect this played
some sort of role. However, there is evidence consistent with
convergence in directions of experimentation. Submitters under
Intermediate Disclosure themselves, as individuals experimented
across 15% fewer solution approaches than did those in Final Dis-
closure (1.67 versus 1.96, on average), as in Table 4 under “Solution
Approaches”. Given fewer submissions and solution approaches
overall in Intermediate Disclosure, we  might expect even randomly
selected approaches to be less likely to overlap – and to be unique in
relation to those used by the wider group. Any deliberate attempts
to differentiate or even to engage in independent experimentation
might then lead to a greater number of unique approaches pursued
per submitter under Intermediate Disclosure. However, we ﬁnd no
such evidence. Unique solution approaches (relative to the group)
per submitter are virtually identical (0.58 and 0.59, in Intermediate
and Final Disclosure.)
K.J. Boudreau, K.R. Lakhani / Research Policy 44 (2015) 4–19 15
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Fig. 4. Solutions by approach (i.e
Further suggestion of convergent coordinated approaches
omes from direct measures of concentration of solution submis-
ions across approaches. The Herﬁndahl measure of concentration
f shares is 52% higher in Intermediate Disclosure (0.149) than
n Final Disclosure (0.0986).16 Beyond being concentrated, sub-
issions in Intermediate Disclosure were concentrated on just
high-potential” approaches. We  rank ordered each of the 54 solu-
ion approaches in the entire experiment by their “potential,” based
n the top score achieved within each approach and found that
16 The Herﬁndahl measure of concentration is the sum of squared shares. There-
ore, a higher Herﬁndahl measure indicates higher concentration. We  calculate the
hare of submissions for each approach within each treatment by dividing the num-
er  of submissions using a particular solution approach, by the total number of
ubmissions in the treatment.Hour Count
ue combination of techniques).
every solution in Intermediate Disclosure employed an approach
that was  above median.
6.3. Replication
Our experimental design minimized replication in order to
maximize group size. Thus, we observe results in single trials of
Intermediate Disclosure and Final Disclosure. This leaves the pos-
sibility that random eccentric outcomes or “butterﬂy effects” could
have still somehow emerged and distorted population-level pat-
terns in some way.17 Some level of assurance already comes from
17 Single-trial comparisons (i.e., where a stream of outcomes resulting from one
policy is compared to a stream of outcomes from another) remain the norm in the
literatures making before-and-after or differences-in-differences comparisons on
effects of innovation policies.
16 K.J. Boudreau, K.R. Lakhani / Rese
Table  5
Regularity of results in relation to mixed comparison group.
Final
disclosure
Mixed
comparison
group
Intermediate
disclosure
Mean Mean Mean
No. subjects assigned 245 244 244
No.  active participants 46 43 33
No.  submissions 319 236 99
No.  examinations 0 654 1359
No.  solution approaches 27 25 19
Max  71 83 100
q90  47 61 94
q75  24 39 38
Median 13 24 11
q25  5 4 5
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riously challenging under best of instances. Lost contractibility
here refers speciﬁcally to the originating innovator’s ability to
uphold stipulations of reuse, including assuring their payoffs andq10  5 5 2
Min  0 0 0
esults conforming closely to a priori reasoned theory and predic-
ions. Further, despite single trials at the population level, we  have
onsiderable replication at the subject level, where there are no
bvious signs of unduly inﬂuential or rogue outlier data points.
In addition, we sought a minimal level of added empirical vali-
ation by running a Mixed treatment (Section 4.2.3). This is not
eplication in the sense of running multiple trails of Intermediate
nd Final Disclosure. It is nonetheless a basis for assessing con-
istency of outcomes with a single separate empirical benchmark
rial. Table 5 reports key summary statistics for the Mixed regime,
elative to the main comparison groups. The results suggest consid-
rable regularity of reported patterns (Table 5). In the case of each
f the main statistics reported earlier – number of participants,
umber of submissions per participant, number of examinations
f intermediate solutions, numbers of solutions generated and
aximum score achieved – the Mixed regime falls between Inter-
ediate and Final Disclosure regimes. The precise distribution of
cores (beyond maximum scores), given by quantiles of ﬁnal scores,
s less regular. Broadly speaking, these comparisons demonstrate
onsiderable regularity of results, providing no indication of eccen-
ric outcomes driving the earlier reported patterns.
. Conclusion
This paper introduced an experimental framework for studying
ffects of disclosure policies on cumulative innovation, while con-
ributing to a growing research interest in disclosures, transfers and
sharing” of knowledge and technology among innovators: “open
nnovation” of various sorts (e.g., West, 2003; von Hippel, 2005;
hesbrough et al., 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006; von Krogh et al.,
003; Murray et al. 2009; Boudreau, 2010; Dahlander and Gann,
010; Furman and Stern, 2011; Williams, 2013). Our goal here
eing to distinguish effects of intermediate versus ﬁnal disclosure
olicies.
This paper contributes to this growing body of work – by ﬁrst
aking two steps back. The ﬁrst step back we take is to observe
hat “open” innovation is hardly an isolated or exceptional phe-
omenon, if by “open” we mean that innovation takes place within
 framework or system that deliberately enables transfers and
euse. We discussed and presented numerous examples (Table 1),
o illustrate that the intended enablement of knowledge and tech-
ology transfers are a routine feature of most every innovation
ystem – including those implemented by both public and private
ctors. This only stands to reason. Where innovators differ in their
apabilities to recombine past innovations into new ones (and it
s not always the originating upstream innovator who is superior
n carrying this out) there will be innovative gains from trans-
ers and reuse taking place. Designing (open) innovation systemsarch Policy 44 (2015) 4–19
therefore entails establishing frameworks in which productive
transfers and exchanges – be they bilateral or multilateral – are
feasibly implemented.
The second step back is to return to the longtime conception
of the process of ongoing innovation as depending not just on
transfers and reuse of knowledge and technologies but also on
maintaining incentives (e.g., Romer, 1990; Green and Scotchmer,
1995). In this regard, this study departs from recent studies that
focus on reuse and ongoing innovation patterns, without simul-
taneously considering how ex post reuse might affect ex ante
incentives to develop the upstream innovation in the ﬁrst place.
We also depart from usual focus on a given institutional setting
and innovation system in favor of considering approaches that
distinguish altogether different systems, following intermediate
disclosure versus ﬁnal disclosure policies. Thus, we consider effects
of disclosure prior to the work on an innovation even being completed
rather than optimal length of patents and other timing issues that
have been studied in the past.
Our work is somewhat analogous to pioneering econometric
studies of naturally occurring contexts examining ex post reuse,
particularly focused on effects of patents on on-going innova-
tion (e.g., Murray et al., 2009; Galasso and Schankerman, 2013;
Williams, 2013; Sampat and Williams, 2014). As patents are, in
principle and by design,18 intended to ease reuse through assign-
ing property rights (Kitch, 1977; Arora et al., 2004), these patent
citation studies can be interpretted as tests of the patent system’s
ability to deliver on this goal. None has yet found evidence of accel-
erated reuse of an innovation subsequent to it being patented. The
results are thus consistent with transaction cost impediments to
disclosures and reuse with patents (e.g., Heller and Eisenberg, 1998)
(presuming there are indeed gains from trade/transfers in the con-
texts studied) – rather than addressing fundamental differences
across systems as we do here. Our theory is consistent with but does
not particularly strongly rely on these results. In terms of methods,
our direct comparison of independent experimental groups under
different disclosure treatments is also analogous to the comparison
of small numbers of cases with and without patents in these studies.
However, rather than compare cases with and without patents or
investigating any one innovation system, our study sought to bet-
ter understand differences across intermediate and ﬁnal disclosure
systems, an essential difference across a wide range of innovation
systems. (The patent system, for example, is but one example of
a ﬁnal disclosure system.) Our work is also somewhat related to
studies by Furman and Stern (2011) and Boudreau (2010), which
document cases in which attempts to deliberately accelerate ex post
reuse indeed did so.
7.1. Incentives-versus-reuse and patterns of “search”
We  develop theory on intermediate versus ﬁnal disclosure by
drawing on insights from the economics of innovation (e.g., Green
and Scotchmer, 1995; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Murray et al.,
2009) and a distinct tradition considering innovation as a com-
plex “search” process (e.g., Nelson, 1961; Simon, 1962; Levinthal,
1997; Fleming, 2001) – showing that both perspectives are required
to understand the most important, ﬁrst-order determinants of
innovation outcomes. A key starting point is our observation that
intermediate disclosures reduce contractibility over transfers and
reuse – where contractibility over innovations is already noto-18 Indeed, the word “patent” derives from Anglo-Norman “lettre patente,” meaning
“open letter.”
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ewards. By the same token, intermediate disclosure leads to ear-
ier, more frequent and potentially wider ranging disclosures, with
ewer stipulations and restrictions on reuse. Under usual contract-
ng conditions surrounding innovation, these conditions imply an
ncentives-versus-reuse tradeoff, which was readily revealed in
ur experimental results. Intermediate disclosure led to 70% fewer
olution submissions.
Apart from the incentives-versus-reuse tradeoff, our exper-
mental analysis starkly revealed the importance of “search
irections” and how systematic differences in choices of solution
pproaches across disclosure policies were essential to shaping
nnovation outcomes. Intermediate disclosures – if only by virtue
f their timing – increase information and signaling in the innova-
ion environment. As a result, choices of solution approaches across
nnovators are less independent, they are more “coordinated.” In
ur experiment, coordination of decisions led to convergence, with
0% fewer solution approaches tried by those working under inter-
ediate disclosure.
.2. Comparative advantages of intermediate and ﬁnal disclosure
olicies
The theoretical and experimental analysis should be understood
s identifying simplest ﬁrst-order tradeoffs and tensions created by
ifferent disclosure policies, necessarily abstracting from the many
etails of any one innovation system. The research design was par-
icularly geared to documenting starkest differences in innovation
utcomes on the basis of uncomplicated cross-sectional compar-
sons and with a minimum of econometric manipulation. Although
 great many questions remain, the results begin to suggest the
utlines of a “division of labor” between intermediate and ﬁnal dis-
losure approaches, while highlighting limitations and challenges
f each.
In our setting, intermediate disclosure promoted efﬁcient reuse,
oordination and convergence on a globally optimal solution with
ess entry and effort (i.e., lower costs) and higher performance.
owever, more generally and in a “rugged” landscape of possi-
le solutions, we might be concerned that intermediate disclosure
ncourages path dependence and lock into a suboptimal solution
pproach, or leads incentives to evaporate. Such systems might
herefore beneﬁt from offsetting features of their design to coun-
ervail these weaknesses, as being directed – for example – to
roblems where the optimal solution approach is well known
nd wide experimentation is less useful and where returns to
euse are especially high. Alternatively, drawing on a wide and
iverse pool of innovators less likely to fall into “groupthink” and
o select on innovator types whose motivations are less dependent
n contractibility of transfers and reuse. Inasmuch as intermedi-
te disclosures imply smaller units of innovation output (e.g., edits,
ontributions, ideas, bug reports) many more individuals may  be
ble to participate by making much smaller effort investments.
In theory and in our experiment, ﬁnal disclosure promotes
igher levels of entry and effort and independent experimenta-
ion. On the one hand, this generated wide diversity of approaches;
n the other hand, this led to considerable effort devoted to sub-
ptimal approaches and overall lesser learning and performance
chieved. The overall empirical result of lower performance under
nal disclosure should hardly be regarded as general; tradeoffs
hould vary in importance according to the particularly prevail-
ng structural conditions. Nonetheless, we might surmise that such
ystems might therefore also beneﬁt from offsetting features of
heir design to countervail these weaknesses. This includes being
evoted to conditions where wide diversity of experimentation is
ighly valued. Alternatively, if capabilities tend to concentrate and
ccumulate in individual innovators and there is little beneﬁt from
rawing on widely distributed contributions, then there may  berch Policy 44 (2015) 4–19 17
higher returns to simply maximizing incentives of greatest experts,
foregoing some degree of reuse.
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